My Case Study on Argentina & Effects of Peronism

Argentina:

A Case Study on Peronism

Without change, how can there be progress? As seen so many times in the history of Latin America populist caudillo governments are slow to accept change. With the constant cries from both the laborers for reform and from the elite for maintenance of the status quo, it is difficult for these leaders to significantly develop their nations. However, Argentina, today displays itself in the top three for Human Development Index of all Latin American countries (World Bank). Although Argentina’s development process has been significantly more successful than most other Latin American countries, their success has been subdued due to the infamous effects of political instability, populism and caudillismo.

Political History of Argentina

Argentina’s recent history has been marked with a long line of military authoritarian rule. As Manwoo Lee points out, Argentina has, since its beginning as an independent nation in 1810, been plagued with either anarchy or caudillo rule (Lee, 558). These caudillos, struck with upholding the traditions of populist authoritarian rule, failed to properly address the needs that every new nation lacks.

In order to have a successful nation there are two key elements that must be established in order to maintain a stable nation. One is the question of political rule. The people must decide whether or not they want a leader who can be democratic or authoritarian. Under the category of choosing a preferential type of government also falls the question of centralization. This is a subcategory that must be established as well. The second key element is the preferred economic system. In an ideal world a leader will take time to gather relevant information as to how to go about modernizing and improving their country.

As the first leaders of Argentina failed to establish these parameters, each of them had a different set of ideas of ideal governing, which led to deep social unrest and overall disdain. However after 1850, Juan Bautista Alberdi and Domingo Faustina Sarmiento developed and implemented their theories of nation building, which resulted in a short period of limited stability. Although both of their theories concentrated on the failures of the “old” method of governing, each theory had a different approach to resolving the issue. Whereas Alberdi declared that European immigration was the key to “creating civilization”, Sarmiento emphasized education of the people in hopes of dispelling the “savage picture provided by the gauchos of the interior” (Lee, 560).

Nevertheless, Lee states that although these men provided a good basis for establishing the young Argentina, their theories resulted in a greater instability in the long run. Lee goes on to say that the increased immigration to Argentina did, in all its help, increase the population of Argentina however since the immigrants had little political experience and therefore fit perfectly with what the gauchos preferred in their governing-a culture of people who did not actively pursue reform (Lee, 561).

In addition, the immigrant population brought forth a middle class. In traditional Argentina, there was the feudal relationship of caudillos or gauchos and the campesinos who worked under them. This new concept of a middle class was not readily accepted even so, the passive idea was that “as long as individuals outside the ruling class did not threaten the lifestyles of the elite they should be left alone” (Lee, 562). It was in this manner that Argentina was governed for many years.

Through this manner of governing, a deep gap was created, setting the stage for a social uprising. Additionally, it is within the nature of the economic system that modernization occurs whether initiated by a government itself or through the involuntary method of globalization. Samuel Huntington developed a theory known as the “gap hypothesis” (Adelman, 244). This idea essentially states that as modernization occurs, standards and expectations increase without the consideration as to whether or not the system in question is able to meet the higher demands. Thus, a gap is created pending disaster and the possibility of unrest is heightened when governments do not reform to meet demands.

This is exactly the case with Argentina just prior to the rise of Perón. Immigrants, although lacking in political experience, were well versed in labor movements and fair work. When the ideas, completely foreign to the near feudal Argentina, began to circulate amongst the citizenry and expectations slowly began to rise, the governments found themselves in a situation they had no power over. With this, the laissez-faire attitude of the government towards the emerging bourgeoisie ended up having to address the concerns and simultaneously “deal with” the middle class as well (Adelman, 245).

Consequently, it was not the government who “dealt with” bridging the gap, rather it was a political party that would begin to ensure the needs of the laborers. In 1916, the Radical Party came to power (Lee, 562). This party was the representative of the middle and lower classes. Lee articulates that as a result of the rise of the Radical party the inert approach of the elite “began for the first time to develop defensive attitudes toward social change and development” (Lee, 562-3).

Henceforth, Lee’s titled article, Argentine Political Instability: A Crisis of Simultaneous Quest for Authority and Equality, comes to fruition. Although lower and middle classes had legitimate representation in government, a tell-tale sign of a growing democracy, “Argentine governments [still] tended to cater to the needs of only…the upper class” (Lee, 563).

It was in an essay by Jose Lucero where the stated that “uprisings and revolutions provoked nightmares in the criollo elite imagination of subaltern sectors waiting like volcanoes to erupt” (Lucero, 30). Better said, the mounting unrest was similar to waiting on a volcano to erupt, the great time there is for the pressure to accumulate the more fury there is to be release when everything falls apart.

Yet, in every tragic story, there is a hero who comes to pull everything together again. Juán Perón rose up as a populist leader with new and vibrant ideas to reform Argentina. He envisioned addressing the aforementioned needs of a nation and undergoing a complete reform the government.

Due to the earlier immigration ideas of Alberdi and Sarmiento, an excess immigrant population had been formed in Argentina. Still, as the elite were not interested in the new bourgeoisie, assimilation into the Argentine “identity” rarely occurred. Subsequently, one of the platforms that Perón ran on was to create an Argentine national identity (Lee, 564).

Peronism

Perón, through his healthy and numerous relations with various labor parties and workers (unionized and not), became such an appealing leader to the lower and middle class especially with his promises of “state jobs and upward social mobility” (Ciria, 22). Ciria also states that Perón’s appeal for every other citizen was a “[fostering] of nationalism, Argentina’s neutrality in the war [WWII], better living conditions and a still imprecise sense of community” (23). Unsurprisingly, the Catholic Church was also a major supporter of Perón and his ideals (23).

Once in power, Perón created the Peronist Party, or the Partido Peronista (PP), which consequently incorporated all of his supporters under one umbrella party (23). Everyone else that he did not have under his party, Perón’s wife at the time-Evita-slowly but surely included them into their national movement.

To add to his popularity, Perón and his wife always followed a policy of direct communication with their followers. It was in this manner that his charisma was able to be seen by Argentineans’ living inside and outside of the major cities (24).

Nevertheless Perón, who enjoyed success in the political arena, failed to adequately address the needs of the economy. Everything looked fine at the beginning, foreign investors were plentiful, light industry was coming to realization, and gross national product (GNP) was on the rise (24). However, as the years moved along, little else was done to embrace free trade and even less was done to keep foreign investors in the country. Perón engaged in spending money everywhere else, such as in the army, as opposed to improving infrastructure. Investors began to back out when Argentina’s external debt became too high due to deteriorating terms of trade thus creating a deficit in their foreign reserves. Perón attempted to correct this occurrence through instituting laws regulating foreign investment, but even these actions came about too late (24-25).

In September 1955, Juan Perón was overthrown through a military golpe de estado due to his unfavorable actions with the Argentine economy. After a short military rule, elections were held in 1957 and all Peronist affiliated parties were forbidden to run. Even again, in 1963 these parties were banned from participating (25).

Peronism Reformed

Despite the banishment of the PP, the various bureaucratic authoritarian regimes (BAU), of which there were many, and through the many general elections held, it is seen that not one group came to power without exhibiting some form of the Peronist ideals. For example, Frondizi was able to win a majority vote by appealing to the Peronists by means of promising “to restore legality for the party, recognize the workers’ confederation, and re-implement some nationalist programs” from the era (26).

The elite were more than overjoyed while Perón was in exile, as they regularly describe Peronismo as the hecho maldito (James, 276). The more that the PP was repressed, the harder it fought to rise, though not always under the Peronist name. Many new parties were created during this time frame that were still Peronist by nature but for the sake of political participation were not the same names (James, 273).

New party names include: the Revolutionary Peronist Youth, Revolutionary Peronist Movement, and others. More importantly than the new names, were the new unions and groups that were formed. One social combative union was the Huerta grande under Frondizi, which increased workers’ living standards (277-8) while another new PP was called the Partido Justicialista (Corradi, 14). Guerilla groups formed, mostly by youth, called Juventud Universitaria Peronista and Juventud Argentina por la Emancipación Nacional (JAEN)(James, 282-3). Many of the youth groups, although rooted in Peronism, actually dispelled Peronist ideals in a way since much of the younger generation concentrated more on getting heard than actually developing an Argentine identity (Ciria, 29).

Peronism Today

Nevertheless, Peronism leaves its mark, even today in everyday Argentinean politics. The current president of Argentina, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, wife of previous president Néstor Kirchner, actively campaign through the Justicialist Party which has “repeatedly reinvented itself to suit the times, shifting from its leftist populist roots to 1990s neoliberalism, and back again” (Sax, 86). Sax, in his article The Power behind Peronism, states that Kirchner has “since sought to distance himself from Duhalde [a remnant of the PP]” as he prefers to construct alliances outside of Peronism (87). After hearing this, many were disheartened due to the apparent attempt to move away from Peronism and the party was split into two “camps” (87).

Conclusion

In the actual Argentine Politics, Peronism is still seen in two different lights. Though there are still those that swear by it, there are others who believe that Peronism, at the end of the day, is just a populist method of governing. However insignificant or significant it may be today, Peronism undoubtedly had many lasting effects in the politics of the region. Peronistic ideals reached even as far as Uruguay and beyond.

References

Adelman, Jeremy. Reflections on Argentine Labour and the Rise of Perón. Bulletin of Latin American Research. Vol 11, No 3 (Sept, 1992) pg. 243-259. www.jstor.org/stable/3338863

Arcenaux, C.L. Institutional Design, Military Rule, and Regime Transition in Agentina (1976-1983): An Extension of the Remmer Thesis. Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol 16, No 3 (1997) pp 327-350. www.jstor.org/stable3338946

Brennan, James P. Review of Peronism without Perón: Unions, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina By: James McGuire. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,Vol 561 (Jan 1999) pp 198-199. www.jstor.org

Ciria, Alberto. Peronism Yesterday and Today. Latin American Perspectives. Vol 1, No 3 (Autumn, 1974) pp 21-41. www.jstor.org/stable/2633118.

Corradi, Juan. Argentina and Peronism: Fragments of the Puzzle. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Autumn, 1974). Pp 3-20. www.jstor.org/stable/2633117.

DeRouen, Karl and Uk Heo. Modernization and the Military in Latin America. British Journal of Political Science. Vol 31, No. 3. (Jul, 2001) pp 475-496. www.jstor.org/stable/3593286.

Eaton, Karl. Can Politicians Control Bureaucrats? Applying Theories of Politica Control to Argentina’s Democracy. Latin American Politics and Society. Vol 45, No 4. (Winter, 2003). Pp 33-62. www.jstor.org/stable/3177130.

James, Daniel. The Peronist Left, 1955-1975. Journal of Latin American Studies. Vol 8, No 2 (Nov, 1976) pp 273-296. www.jstor.org/stable/156528.

Lee, Manwoo. Argentine Political Instability: A Crisis of Simultaneous Quest for Authority and Equality. Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol 11, No 4 (Oct, 1969). Pp 558-570. www.jstor.org.

Lucero, Jose. Locating the "Indian Problem": Community, Nationality, and Contradiction in Ecuadorian Indigenous Politics. Latin American Perspectives, Vol 30, No 1. (Jan, 2003) pp 23-48. www.jstor.org.

Munck, Ronaldo. Democratization and Demilitarization in Argentina, 1982-1985. Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol 4, No 2 (1985) pp 85-93. www.jstor.org.

Sax, David. The Power Behind Peronism. Foreign Policy, No 144 (Sept-Oct, 2004) pp 86-87.